17 Novembre 2009


idegger says that, primarily, in order for an entity to be asserted about, it must already be unveiled for the Dasein that is doing the asserting, that is, must be intra worldly. But since, as was said of Lotze, any assertion refers to a more primary unveiling of the entity, to being true, the copula is not itself determinable or concretizable in any assertion because it refers to what is always already unveiled before any assertion. The 'is' bears witness to that third element of the intentional structure at work in any assertion that allows the 'asserting about-asserted about' structure to be. In any assertion about the entity, essentia and existentia, whatness and the mode of being of the entity is already pre-understood, since the entity is intra worldly. Aristotle says that truth is not in things, but in the understanding. But this simply says that the truth is not extant like things, and so it is unclear what it means to say that the truth is in the understanding. But since understanding is a mode of the comportment of Dasein, it must be inquired into in relation to Dasein. Only if the nature of the understanding is cleared up can it be claimed in what sense Aristotle says that truth is in the understanding. Heidegger suggests that "truth neither is present among things nor does it occur in a subject [as a psychic process] but lies - taken almost literally - in the middle 'between' things and Dasein. Being true in the sense ofaletheia or unveiling is something that Dasein does to beings so that they can stand forth in there being, and, as was is true in the case of the shoemaker, allows 71 Dasein to understand itself. The shoemaker understands the produced shoes in such a way that the shoemaker unveils himself as a shoemaker at the same time. Hence, it belongs to Dasein' s existence, is a mode of Dasein' s being, a way that Dasein is (BP, 216)." Truth occurs in the subject, but not in the problematic sense of the assertion that then has to agree with something outside the mind, but rather as a way of Dasein's being. As the threefold intentional structxire belongs to truth, Heidegger comments that To the Dasein as unveiling there belongs essentially something unveiled in its unveiledness, some entity to which the unveiling relates in conformity with its intentional structure. There belongs to unveiling, as to every other intentional comportment, an understanding of the being of that to which this comportment relates as such. In unveiling assertion the Dasein is directed toward something which it understands beforehand in that entity's unveiledness ... Truth and being- true as unveiledness and unveiling have the Dasein 's mode of being (BP, 217) Hence, in the unveiledness of the unveiled thing, Dasein as unveiling is relating to something that has Dasein's mode of being. In other words, Dasein already has an understanding of the being that is unveiled because the unveiledness of that unveiled being has the mode of being of the Dasein. This does not mean that the entity, such as the unicorn, implies a relation to Dasein, but rather that the mode of being of the unicorn, 'imaginary,' does. Hence, truth as unveiling is a determination of Dasein, and unveiledness is a possible determination of the extant, insofar as Dasein, for lack of a better phrase, gives 'something' that has Dasein's mode of being to the extant when it comports itself to the extant (such as happens when Dasein makes an assertion about it). Generally speaking, in whatever way Dasein comports itself to an entity, something in the entity will have the mode of the being of Dasein because that third element in the intentional structure, as is easily shown in the case of illusions, is a 72 structural element of the intentional act itself, regardless of whether we are speaking of the unveiledness of the unveiled, or the objectness (standing-over-againstness, gegenstand) of the object, or anything else. Standing-over-againstness is not a necessary determination of the object, but rather a possible one that is necessary insofar as Dasein is comporting itself towards it, and is, in Heidegger's terms, what is mean by the phrase Dasein 's Transcendence. Unveiledness, Truth, therefore, is not in the subject or the object, but somehow between them. What this third something is in its being still needs to be determined, since all that is known so far is that Dasein must already understand the entity in some sense if it comports itself to the entity, that is, insofar as the entity is in the world. The question, though, is becoming more difficult, because it is still unclarified in what sense Aristotle's theory of the judgement is to be understood in relation to the being of man. It should at least be noted that, according to the manifold senses of 'Being' illustrated (essentia and existentia), that being cannot be a genus, and must be analogical, since both existence and essence pertain to beings, and existence and essence both are, but not in the same way. In order to clarify the matter somewhat, we must show how Aristotle casts light on the relation of the assertion to the being of Dasein by considering being as presence and the at-hand. (V) Dasein and Presence-at-Hand Of the many senses of essence that Heidegger attempts to explicate in terms of the Greek theory of production, the first is morphe or shape, which we discussed earlier. The form, which, as producing, is primarily to be understood in terms of a forming-so-as- 73 to-give-shape, was one of the primary senses of essence for the Greeks. The forming, for the Greeks, allows there to be a particular entity to be looked at, and hence for the Greeks the thinghood of the thing consists of these two elements (form and look). Heidegger comments that Forming and shaping lend its own peculiar look to what is to be produced and has been produced. Look is the ontological sense of the Greek expression eidos or idea. In the look of the thing we are able to see what it is, its thingness, the peculiar character impressed on it (BP, 106). Conceptually, for the Greeks, the look that something presents is grounded in the thing's form or morphe. Heidegger claims, however, that for the Greeks the ontological significance of the look-form relation is not determined by the form, in the sense we would say that the form is understood to determine the look we have of the thing in perception. Rather, look, understood ontologically, determines the form or morphe for the Greeks, because the look is primarily to be taken as a production, not as a perception. Forming, as Heidegger says, is enacted on something in the light of an anticipation of a model, guide or standard of some sort. The painter, for instance, utilizes the paint and creates a painting according to a model, an idealized painting that is the actual painting before hand, its ground. This model, which is anticipated before hand, carries the ownmost sense of eidos, ^^ which is why the shaped or formed product is understood as a posterior likeness of the look or eidos, and is grounded in it. In this sense essence as form carries the sense '^It is therefore imprecise to characterize the primary sense of eidos as the look of the thing at hand, as Mehta does, "Idea or eidos means the look, the view presented by anything that confronts us, its visage (Philosophy, 416)." Eidos primarily has the sense of the look of the thing prior to its coming into being. 74 of production: If the shaped product, the form (morphe), is founded in the eidos, then this means that both concepts are understood by reference to the process of shaping, forming, producing. The order and connection of these two concepts is established by the performance of the process of forming and shaping and the necessary precedence in that process of the look of what is to be formed. (BP, 107). Prior to actualization, then, the entity qua thing actually formed already was before (ti en einai), as anticipatory look in the imagination. It is from the eidos that the formed thing receives its genos, which is not simply a group in the sense oi genus but rather its kind, its family or stock. The determination 'group' does not carry the specificity of sense that 'family {gene ton ontonf does, because one might say 'this entity belongs to this group accidentally.' 'Family,' on the other hand, does, in the sense that we would say that (C) Smith is on account of having been produced by (A), and (B), or in relation to what was said earlier, that the particular work of art is essentially of that stock, and that 'Art' is not some indifferent category that lords over it. The notion of eidos as seeing-before is also brought out in what the Greeks understood as the mathematical. In Greek, the mathema are those things which are properly leamable, of which numbers are the exemplary case. These things are properly leamable because we already have them with us somehow. We say, for instance, that there are three books. We do not read 'threeness' off the books, but already have a vague idea of it, which enables us to identify the books as just these particular three. Given this particular instance of the mathematical, the mathematical in general is this dimension of the thing that is always already with us in an indeterminate way. The mathematical is that evident aspect of things within which we are always already moving and according to which we experience them as things at all, and 75 as such things. The mathematical is this fundamental position we take toward things by which we take up things as already given to us, and as they should be given. Therefore, the mathematical is the fundamental presupposition of the knowledge of things. Therefore, Plato put over the entrance to his Academy the words 'Let no one who has not grasped the mathematical enter here!' These words do not mean that one must be educated in only one subject - 'geometry,' but that he must grasp the fundamental condition for the proper possibility of knowing is the knowledge of the flmdamental presupposition of all knowledge and the position we take based on such knowledge (WT, 75-6). It was said earlier that one of the primary determinations of essence in the Greeks, phus is, denoted production in the sense of a self-producing, a production out of itself, as in the growing of a plant. The actual plant becomes actualized out of its own nature (phusis), wliich in this case serves the function of the eidos or look in the previous example. The actual maple tree, so to speak, is an incomplete expression of its nature, maple tree-ness. The produced being, which comes to be and passes away, is produced out of its own nature or phusis, the being of that particular entity, which is prior than it and not itself subject to change. Plato also infers from this that the most true, the being of the entity which gives rise to it, is also the most actual, to vAt phusis carries existentia as well as essentia. The actualization of the possible presses the entity into a fully finished limit or boundary, so that the entity is now available to be trapped in a definition, "the concept that comprehends the boundaries containing the reality of what has been formed (BP, 108)." Hence, for the Greeks, whatever makes up a producing which results in the actual produced thing constitutes is essence or thinghood of the entity, and is understood as the productive comportment of Dasein towards entities, and specifically in terms of the productive seeing explained earlier. This is clear enough in terms of artifacts, and also with things we do not produce if we consider the notion of a 76 productive-seeing-before-hand. (VI)TheDaofDaseiii The Da of Dasein is the place of entities, insofar as an entity is understood as something actualized, fully fuiished and produced and hence available for use (available to be contemplated, worked with, etc.). Once the entity is produced it is available and is understood as being in such a way that it is already fully standing on its own account and available for whatever use we may have for it (such as is the case with the shovel currently resting out in the shed), our property. According to Heidegger, as understood in the aforesaid context, the entirerty of these useful entities is, for the Greeks, hupokeimenon: to/7ro-duce, to place-Aere, //er-stellen, means at the same time to bring into the narrower or wider circuit of the accessible, here, to this place, to the Da, so that the produced being stands for itself on its own account and remains able to be found there and to lie-before there [vorliegen] as something established stably for itself. This is the source of the Greek term hupokeimenon, that which lies-before. That which first of all and constantly lies-before in the closest circle of human activity and accordingly is constantly disposable is the whole of all things of use, with which we constantly have to do, the whole of all those existent things which are meant to be used on one another, the implement that is employed anA the constantly used products of nature: house and yard, forest and field, sun, light and heat. What is thus tangibly present-for-dealing'with'^ [vor-handen] is reckoned by everyday experience as that which is, as a being, in the primary sense. Disposable possessions and goods, property, are beings; they are quite simply that which is, the Greek ousia. In Aristotle's time, when it already had a firm terminological meaning philosophically and theoretically, this expression ousia was still synonymous with property, possessions, means, wealth (BP, 108). To say that, for the Greeks, an entity's existentia, existence, or mode of being is presence-at-hand, means that an entity, in accordance v^ath its being a finished or "The dashes connecting the present string of words does not exist in the English version of this text, but the sense suggests that they be linked in some way. 77 produced thing, is present or available for our disposal, but more specifically it is there in our immediate vicinity or field of concerns. This is the case whether or not the being is an artifact, whether it is produced by human hands or not, for reasons we have seen. An entity is extant or actual to the extent that it is actually produced and hence available for us. This is why Heidegger says that, for the Greeks, "a being is synonymous with an at- hand [extant] disposable (BP, 108-109)." Hence, for the Greeks, ousia or essence did not carry a sense that essence does today, whereby essence is strictly separated from existence - nor can it be, as Aristotle's critique of Antiphon showed. Ousia for the Greeks is a whatness/thingness and extantness/mode of being, although for the Greeks the existence (presence) aspect is stressed much more than the essence aspect (which is the opposite of how things are for us today). For the Greeks, the presence of the entity does not refer to a quality of the entity as disposable, but our finding or encountering the entity as disposable, not after the fact, but in its production. The entity is produced, whatever the specific purpose it will serve, in such a way that it is a production towards the producing of a finished, available, present-at-hand entity. The presence at hand is intended in the production, what Heidegger calls "an out-look upon the look (eidos) of that which is to be produced. When Parmenides says that being, thinking and actuality are the same, he has in mind something like the forethought that anticipates a producing (cf BP, 1 10)," although the precise sense of this will need to be dealt with more explicitly later. This thought is, for Parmenides, not creative in the sense of something that the individual person comes up with, but rather something that comes to the thinker, somewhat like what we would call 78 'inspiration.' This is because the Greeks fundamentally understood 'seeing' as an insight given to them, in the sense that the Oracle is given a sign of the things to come (though not a detailed account) by the divinity. In a sense it could be said that anyone who has the capacity for such things, or has stayed up all night in the attempt to figure something out which all of the sudden 'comes to them' at four in the morning, realizes that thinking, in its essence, is a waiting and a being given. This is correct, but imprecise. Insight [Einsehen] is not different from what is meant above, but it is not quite that arbitrary either. The notion of insight essentially bears the mark of impotence on the part of the cognizing individual. Generally speaking, it is a seeing, not in the sense of seeing a thing, but rather in the sense of what must already be seen in order to see a particular thing (In the ZoUikon seminar Heidegger sites the specific case of having to already 'see' the 'existence' of a table even though [following Kant] exisence is not a quality of the table), (cf Z, 7) What primarily interests Heidegger, though, is not the fact that we always already operate in lieu of these various ontological determinations which are generally hidden to us, but rather what is needed in order to force them out of their hiding place. Being is held in a hiding-waiting, this is the theos or god or ground out of which it emerges, (cf N, 184) This is specifically accomplished via various kinds of steresis of privation, which Plato first successfully isolated in the sophist. We will be examining the notion of privation throughout this thesis. Heidegger sets himself the task of understanding the connection and original unity of essentia/existentia in the productive comportments of Dasein, which ancient ontology operates according to even thought this is never an explicit theme for them. 79 The point, then, is to '"conceive beings with respect to their being by having regard to the Dasein (psuche, nous, logos) (BP, 1 10)." When there is the productive comportment of the Dasein, such as is explicit in the production of great artwork, it operates in such a way the thing is produced so as to make it stand on its own, not suggesting itself of a relation to the producer (cf PLT, OWA, 40, 65; BP, 1 13). We say, for instance, that the greatness of a particular painting or sculpture of piece of poetry lies in the fact that it is not simply the reflection of the peculiarities of the creator, but rather is produced in such a way that it stands forth in its own greatness, regardless of who made it. The in-itself of the product is not simply present in the finished product, but is intended in the producing, to wit producing does not simply refer to the act of the Dasein, but the in-itself of the product. The peculiarity, then, is that something produced in no way, as might be suggested by common understanding, refer back to the producer. Insofar as the self- eflFacement of the producer is intended in the production, the produced entity is what it is precisely because it does not refer back to the producer (cf BP, 1 14). Being and Time, for instance, is what it is for us, not because Heidegger wrote it, but because it has its qualities in itself, irrespective of who wrote it. Had, for instance, Scheler constructed the piece, it would lose nothing. Production happens in such a way that the in-itselfiiess of the product is intended along with whatever it happens to be in its peculiarity. It may be contended that this analysis is interesting and yet tnte because it is simply an analysis of produced entities, and clearly every entity caimot be said to resuh from the productive comportment of the Dasein. Did not the Greeks take for their theme the cosmos as a whole which was eternal, and not anything produced or the productive 80 comportments of the Dasein? This characterization, \^ch would appear to be the case, is manifestly false. Heidegger argues that, as in the production of a house, there is material used that is not itself produced but rather already available for the production. Hence, productive comportment does not restrict itself to that which needs to be produced, but also relates itself, for instance, to the material used in production. But then what is not itself in need of production does not become manifest as an in-itself primarily, as the produced entity did, but rather is discovered primarily in the production process. In Heidegger's words, "The understanding of being in production is so far from merely understanding beings as produced that it rather opens up precisely the understanding of the being of that which is already simply extant (CF. BP, 1 16)." Unless this was the case, we would be not be able to understand matter as that which is already there so as to be available for production. Production, then, as Heidegger says, "served as the horizon for the ontological interpretation of beings (BP, 1 16)" for the Greeks. That this was the case for the Greeks was one thing, but it must be recalled why this was the case, namely, that in a productive seeing hyle was that which was primed to emerge as eidos. It can be seen, then, that the assertion and judgement imply a relation to the comportment of Dasein to things. But now that this has been established, we need to ask what the various kinds of comportments were that the Greeks felt Dasein could have to things. The reason is that, as was said at the beginning of this chapter, the Greeks understood the philosophical way of life as the highest kind of existence. In the next chapter we will see that this is specifically related to the kinds of beings that 81 philosophical Dasein is related to. 82 CHAPTER4 The Greek Positing of the Philosopher in Relation to the Tragic Nature of Greek Existence The aim of this chapter is to inquire into the various ways that Aristotle outlined that Dasein comports itself toward entities. What is hoped here is that the philosopher will be shown to be the highest mode of existence for the Greeks precisely because of the way in which the philosopher 'is' and the kinds of entities the philosopher comports itself to. It was said earlier that the Dasein is attuned by a fundamental boredom, a refiisal of things, to wit nothing can concern or oppress us absolutely. What we will now begin to see is that the Greeks not only understood this, but they also emphasized that there is an essential restlessness to himian existence, whereby himian are driven, according to their essential unhomeliness, to be satisfied with the beings they are concerned with, and yet never are. We shall approach this here according to aletheia, unhiddeness, specifically the uncovering of beings. (I) The Mode of Aletheia in Aristotle Heidegger suggests that the Greek concept of truth, which for modem thinking means the agreement of the judgement with its object, that is, correctness as certainty, ''' was understood as unhiddetmess, in the same form that we would say imperfect or blind (not-seeing). The notion of the unhidden is important because it implies a relation to the hidden, a wresting fi-om the hidden. Heidegger indicates that this occurs in a twofold '"Although certainty as the ultimate arbiter of truth only entered the western tradition following the Christian theological interpretation of truth, specifically in Luther and Thomas, and there only under the specific rubric that arose for a need for the certainty of the salvation of the soul (cf esp.P 51-4). 83 way for the Greeks. In the first place, it means that the uncoveredness of the Being of beings is not simply given, but need to be wrested from hiddenness. This is meant in the same sense that we say how the Being of a being is not simply given, but must be uncovered or made manifest through our cognitive efforts. For the most part. Being as such is uncovered in the everyday only insofar as everyday Dasein requires it. This allows understanding (comfortably familiar) commerce with the entities that are closest to us and which we are primarily concerned with - however it also means that Being is primarily veiled. Secondly, whatever of Being is originally uncovered according to the needs of everyday Dasein is, more or less immediately afterward, covered up again by idle talk when what is understood as Being becomes locked down in concepts and truisms. Heidegger comments that Dasein need not bring itself face to face with entities themselves in an 'original' experience; but it nevertheless remains in a Being-towards these entities. In a large measure uncoveredness gets appropriated not by one's own uncovering, but rather by hearsay of something that has been said (BT, 266) We should note that it is such things as truisms that Plato constantly attacked in the dialogues, taking common opinions and "breaking through truisms and coming to a genuine understanding of the phenomenon (PS, 9)." Consequently, for Plato "[wjith regard to this double coveredness, a philosophy faces the tasks, on the one hand, of breaking through for the first time to the matters themselves (the positive task) and, on the other hand, of taking up at the same time the battle against idle talk (PS, 11)." For Heidegger, Aletheia as imconcealedness of the Being of beings requires that the beings be encountered, and therefore the disclosure of the being of beings requires 84 that there be a Dasein, since Disclosing is a mode of the being of Dasein, that is, disclosure or removing the world from coveredness is a way in which the Dasein is. Aletheia generally manifest itself in legein or speaking, insofar as it is a speaking about the world. This speaking about the world is a way in which E^asein expresses itself, in the sense that it announces itself as the sort of being that speaks about the world, is concerned about the world and the things in it, and this self-expressive speaking about is "what most basically constitutes human Dasein (BP, 12)." For Aristotle this logos primarily took the form of either an affirmation or denial of some quality of a thing, although this required a prior disclosiveness of the entity. For, as Heidegger says, even if we were to deny a certain quality of something it must already have been disclosed what the thing is so that we know the particular quality is what does not belong to it. For Heidegger's reading of the Greeks, Aletheia, the disclosing of beings according to affirmation and denial, is outlined by Aristotle in five differem way in the Nicomachean Ethics (VI, 3, 1 149b 15ff). The five ways are "know-how (in taking care, manipulating, producing), science, , circumspection (insight), understanding, and perceptual discernment. As an appendix, Aristotle adds 'to deem,' 'to take something as something [in the sense of 'I deem it worthy, I take it as being worthy],' and 'doxa, view' [in the sense of 'in my view'], opinion. These latter two determinations have the possibility of being false, "can distort beings, [they] can thrust [themselves] ahead [of beings] (PS, 15)," though they need not be. If, in my opinion, I view something thusly, it may or may not actually be the case. Hence, along with general concealment and idle talk, there is a third way that beings are concealed, through error connected to deeming 85 and opinion. Let us briefly consider what Heidegger interprets Aristotle to be describing in the various modes of Aletheia. Know-how in taking care, manipulating and producing is manifested in specific modes, such as the mode of tailor or that of shoemaker. Know- how does not refer to the actual producing that is enacted by the tailor or shoemaker, but the know-how that the tailor or shoemaker already has so that they are able to produce. Science is a kind of theoretical knowledge of things. Circumspection (insight) is like know-how, except that the object of its inquiry is the human, not artifacts. Wisdom is real understanding, that which the philosopher engages in. 'Mind' or nous is somewhat different, in that it is " a discernment that discerns by way of perception. Noein had emerged already at the decisive beginning of Greek philosophy, where the Destiny of Greek and Western philosophy was decided, namely in Parmenides: discerning and what is discerned are the same (PS, 16)." Discernment with perception is the only one of the modes of aletheia that is not a speaking, although it is connected to legein. Heidegger suggests that Human Dasein is in truth insofar as it is with unconcealed beings by striving against the threefold concealedness of beings elucidated above, while the 'they' or 'the many' are generally not striving toward the unconcealing of beings. This does not mean that being in truth has to do with a possession of objective truths, since prejudices and 'the obvious' are often seen as objective and universally valid even though they distort the matters that they are supposed to be revealing. On the other hand, something can be genuinely true, if only for one person. Heidegger points out that the Logos is the speaking (legein) and the spoken 86 (legomenon). If the speaking is preserved in the spoken and is hence a proper proposition, then the spoken is alethes. This is how truth is generally understood, although it is also where problems can arise. If truth is located in the spoken or said, then we can adhere to the said without actually tracing it back to the matter at hand. Heidegger gives the example of the proposition or said 'Some days ago it rained.' He writes that "[s]ome days ago it rained, I can say, without presentifying to myself the rain, etc. I can repeat propositions and understand them without having an original relation to the beings of which I am speaking (PS, 18)." This means, I can understand the proposition as true without calling to my mind the image of the raining itself that I experienced on that day, or even without actually having experienced the raining, but merely having heard about it second hand. This is for the Greeks, Heidegger says, something that is a so-called \x\xXh without a genuine aletheuein going on, because there is no real connection between the proposition and the matter it discusses, an idle talking. It is, Heidegger says, the logos of idle talk, the detached proposition which has lost the connection to the matters themselves in the sense illustrated above that is true or untrue in the sense that we now understand these terms, correct and false. Since the said is detached from the matters at hand, truth becomes the agreement of the proposition with them. But, Heidegger says, to determine truth as the correspondence of the proposition and the thing necessitates that there has already been a prior revelation of the being itself, the truth as uncovering. Hence such a concept of truth, which determines truth as the correspondence of the soul, the subject, with the object, is nonsense. For I must have already known the matter in question in order to be able to say that it corresponds with the 87 judgement. I must have already known the objective in order to measure the subjective up to it. The truth of 'having already known' is thus presupposed for the truth of knowing. And since this is nonsensical, this theory of truth cannot be maintained (PS, 18). I must have already presentified to myself in some way, for instance, the connection of the experience of raining and the proposition 'it was raining' in order for the two to later become detached and then have the ability for them to be reconnected, depending on \^iiether I thought that in this circumstance it was actually the case or not. The general adhering of Dasein to the said instead of trying to get to the real matter is part of what Heidegger calls Dasein's 'fallenness'. Heidegger provides a useful categorization to help us understand what has been said. In terms of four of the ways in which aletheia was outlined above - science, wisdom, know-how and circumspection (insight) - science and wisdom are epistemonikon, contributive toward the development of knowledge, and know-how and circumspection (insight) are logistikon, contributive toward the development of circumspective consideration or deliberating. 'What' dimension is disclosed about a being depends on 'how,' the 'way in which' it is approached, either through epistemonikon or logistikon. The fifth determination oi aletheia, nous, is not strictly present under epistemonikon or logistikon because nous or 'mind' is somehow present in each of science, wisdom, know- how and circumspection (insight), since they are dianoein, ways in which noein can be enacted (cf PS, 20). Heidegger characterizes the distinction between epistemonikon and logistikon in the following way The epistemonikon is that ... with which we regard beings whose archai cannot be otherwise, ... beings which have the character ofaidion, of being eternal. The logistikon is that ... with which we regard beings ... that can also be otherwise. f.-i., 88 The [logislikon] are the beings techne and phrones is deal with. Techne has to do with things which first have to be made and which are not yet what they will be [since, as Heidegger said, techne has to do with the know-how that proceeds the actual producing]. Phronesis [circumspection, insight] makes the situation accessible; and the circumstances are always different in every action. On the other hand, episteme and sophia concern that which already was, that which man does not first produce (PS, 20). This is not a^wr/b/c/ distinction that is the result of any grandiose speculation, but rather a compartmentalizing of the various ways in which everyday Dasein deal with beings. There are, so to speak, two regions of Being which are investigated according to which the way Dasein comports itself, although in a sense there is only one. Kisiel says "the mode of... comportment or disclosive capacity differs accordingly as the kind of being which is revealed differs (Genesis, 303)." The entities of the logistikon, the constantly changing things of home and country, which have the characteristics of the possibility of being otherwise, is what it is in contrast to the beings of the epistemonikon, such as the heavens and the stars, the world of nature, which are always the same. Insofar as the philosopher pursues that which is always the same, 1 shall show why the philospher is the highest mode of Greek Dasein. (II) The Relative Strength of the Modes of Uncovering Heidegger points out that Aristotle raises the question as to the whether the epistemonikon or the logistikon is better in uncovering beings as they are. To begin to answer this, Aristotle says that the greatest mode of uncovering beings in terms of the epistemonikon, so that we are "dwelling with them (PS, 21)," is wisdom, genuine understanding, while the greatest mode for the logistikon is circumspection (insight). There is always a stratification regarding the degree to wdiich an entity has been 89 uncovered, and the ways in which the world is uncovered for Dasein are not all indifferently on the same plane. For Heidegger, what is interesting is that Aristotle in his most in depth analyses does not proceed from the highest modes of aletheuein, but rather the lowest, science and know-how, those modes which are most accessible to everyday Dasein. I will now delineate the precise meanings of science, wisdom, know-how and circumspection (insight) in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle. The question which is asked of all of the modes of aletheuein is twofold in Aristotle: "1). What is the character of the beings which the mode of aletheuein uncovers, and 2)does the respective mode of aletheuein also disclose the arche of those beings? (PS, 22)," although it is initially unclear why this is. Heidegger suggests that the first determination of the entities toward which science orients itself is that they are determined within the horizon of time. The beings of the science or knowing are understood on the basis of time, as those which always are, cannot be otherwise. Science has the sense of being informed about something, already knowing it. I understand this to mean that if, for instance, someone was beginning to teach me what the boiling px)int of water was a standard room pressure by showing me the water being heated to 100 degrees Celsius, I would stop them and say that I already know that, am already informed on that point. This is possible because the object of my knowledge always is that way, the boiling point never alters, and hence I can be informed about it. Things, on the other hand, which I cannot be informed about have a transitory character and hence require me to be present with them at every moment (as otherwise I would not have a grasp on them) are not objects of knowledge in this sense. Hence, to have an opinion about that which 90 changes could be wrong if the thing itself is not present, and hence such a cognitive relation to the changing is not knowledge. In this way, in science I tarry beside the being even if it is not actually present to me. Heidegger suggests that the beings that science apprehends neither came into being nor will they go out of it, but rather are constantly. As such, the being that science orients itself toward is most properly a being. But, since the being of the entities that science orients itself to are determined as (their how, epistemic entities as epistemic entities, as opposed to, for instance, gear as gear) being constantly, then "beings are determined with regard to their Being by a moment of time ... The onto are aidia [aei, aiwn], ..always, everlasting, ... that which coheres in itself, that which is never interrupted (PS, 23)." DeBoer says "Aristotle's question concerning beings as beings - that is to say, concerning that which essentially belongs to beings - is guided by a specific concept of being as such: that which of beings is constantly present for a theoretical beholding is above all that which is (DeBoer, 27)." Let us consider why DeBoer is not entirely correct here. Aristotle, in De Caelo, also understands the aion as a lifetime, ton apanta aiona, fiill presence, the determinate time of a living thing is presence. But how can it be that a living thing, since it only has a finite existence, is aiwn, and the objects oi science, the beings that are a being in its most proper sense, are also aiwnl For Aristotle, the aiwn also means the time of the world, which is eternal. The living thing's aiwn, its determinate life which receives its determination by being limited by birth and death, is determined in relation to the heavens (cf PS, 23), ouranos, in the sense that the 91 changeable is understood as changeable in contrast with the eternal, the stars and the heavens. Let us consider this further. Heidegger suggests that the Aidia always are, and hence are earlier than the things that come into being and pass away. They are always 'now,' and this presence is what for the Greeks, in a certain sense, meant Being. Since the changeable and the perishable are determined in relation to presence, the aidia are what most properly is, and are the arche or origin of all other beings. Without this everlasting ground, the determinations of beings would be entirely unintelligible. The heavens for Aristotle are not in time but are nonetheless eternal, because for Aristotle what is in time is what is measured by time, by means of the nows, and what is constantly and always now is thereby numberless and not limitable (apeiron), is not measurable by the nows, and is none-the-less eternal, earlier than anything that comes into time. The aidion is thus not in time but none-the-less determined in this way. Heidegger suggests that, for Aristotle, then, the being of beings is interpreted in the horizon of time, "beings are interpreted as to their Being on the basis of time (PS, 24)," whether or not for Aristotle this projection ever became a specific theme or not. To say that the objects of science, which are most properly being, are interpreted on the basis of time, means that beings as being are understood within a temporal horizotL Heidegger suggests that the second determination of the objects of science is that they are something demonstrated, teachable and leamable. Science or knowledge is of such a kind that it can be taught, and know-how also bears this quality. Teachability or communicability is the most essential determination of science, which is why n mathematics is the premier science, since it is the most teachable. Moreover, since we are in some sense always with the objects of science and hence do not have to actually uncover them. Public oratory is a speaking that is also teachable because it is based on the use and manipulation of what everyone already commonly understands. Heidegger makes the interesting point, however, that oratory is not a demonstration, but does create belief in something by invoking such an obvious example that it is taken by the audience to be universal (katholou), applicable beyond that specific case because of the obviousness of it, which may or may not be an accurate revelation of the matter at hand. In other words, oratory is a leading as opposed to a demonstration. Heidegger points out that the sullogismos also works in this way, by proceeding from what is accepted by everyone and hence not a questionable matter itself to what seems to follow from it, or in other words the conclusion is reached from what is known at the outset. This is how science works. It is able to teach what is not known because it is simply a precession firom what is already knovm. Mathematics is hence eminently teachable because the student simply proceeds from the mathematical axioms without having to actually understand or question the axioms themselves. The axioms, for instance, of math, occasionally have a proof of them, but this is done mathematically, through deduction or the establishment of relations, and hence already presuppose that which the proof is being attempted of Hence, says Heidegger, science and sullogismos cannot, as the striking example of the orator seems to do, unveil the arche as the universal {katholou), which is why oratory is not science and science needs something that it cannot explain out of itself There is only a science because something has already 93 provided a foundation for it. Heidegger argues that, for Aristotle, if science cannot disclose the arche, the beings as such, then it is deficient, since it requires something else. Therefore, science is not the highest mode of aletheue in with respect to the epistemonikon, but rather wisdom has this honor. Within science itself, there is also a deficient mode, which only knows the result without a sullogismos, without an understanding of how the result was arrived at. Generally, though, science does not show that which show themselves,'* the everlasting beings as everlasting, and therefore the arche remains hidden. This is the answer to the twofold question that was suggested earlier as the structures of the modes of aletheuein, in this case, of the science. It reveals its beings in such a way that has been described, and is therefore a deficient kind of aletheuein, in that it cannot, firom out of itself, truly exhibit the Being of the beings that it deals with. Just as the science within the epistemonikon, know-how within the logistikon is also the most immediate form, that which is dealt with by people in the everyday, and also has the two-fold questioning pertaining to it, and is also deficient. The most immediate in either case is aletheuein, but ungenuine aletheuein. Science disclosed the beings that are everlasting, while know-how discloses beings that can be different. Since the objects of know-how are not the produced things as such but the object contemplated in the producing, they have possibility, can be brought into Being differently, and are constantly becoming, therefore. Heidegger points out that all of the modes of aletheuein have some manner of '^phainomena ' in Greek, cf HCT, 81. 94 science within them. The objects of know-how are the purely possible and hence could come into being otherwise than it is currently being conceived of. In other words, the beings of know-how are in the process of becoming, since they are purely possible. What is to be produced is not yet, and hence is not always and could come into being otherwise than according to the vision we have of it. Know-how is a preparing to execute or enact or bring something into being correctly. Know-how does not have the idea of the thing as its goal, but rather the thing itself, and hence the idea is not in the thing itself, but beside it, in the sense it is in the soul. In contrast, the beings of nature do not have human creators, so that which guides the production and the thing produced (eg. Plant from seed) are identical. Know-how is not a genuine aletheuein because the finished product does not belong to the domain of know-how, as once the product is done, it ceases to be a concern of know-how, and falls into the domain of human use. The shoe is made for wearing and is for someone. This double character entails that the ergon of Wv^poiesis is something produced for further use, for man. Techne therefore possesses the ergon as an object of its aletheuein only as long as the ergon is not yet finished. As soon as the product is finished, it escapes the domain of techne: it becomes the object of the use proper to it. Aristotle expresses this precisely: the ergon is "para' (cf Nic. Eth. 1, 1, 1094a4f ). The ergon, as soon as it is finished, is para, 'beside,' techne. Techne, therefore, is concerned with beings only insofar as they are in the process of becoming (PS, 29)." Therefore, Heidegger says that in know-how, the outward look of the thing is that which is in the soul before hand and which guides the production, the outward look being the "proper presence" of the thing to be produced, what is 'pre-presentified' [vergegenwartigt]. I understand this to mean, for instance, that the house which will some day be present is presentified beforehand as it is going to look. Heidegger points 95 out that the matter is what does not have to be produced but is that from which the thing is produced and is in a certain sense already there in the outward look. The producer always has his eye on the outward look as he enacts the production, the movement, the outward look being the arche of the movement. Hence, as is proper to an arche, it is there at the inception and at all points along the way. Circumspection (insight), unlike know-how, has as its concern human action. There is deliberation about circumspection (insight), and hence the object here is the best way to act. Heidegger says that the "deliberation of circumspection (insight) is, furthermore, a certain drawing of conclusion: if such and such is supposed to occur, if I am to behave in such a way, then ... [T]he deliberation of phronesis, like that of know- how, is related to something which can be otherwise (PS, 35)." In a certain regard know- how and circumspection (insight) are similar because both have to do with outcomes and what must happen in order for those outcomes to come to fruition. However, in the case of know-how the actions themselves are not the object of consideration, but rather the things to be produced. On the other hand, in circumspection (insight), there is deliberation on the actions of one to whom the actions belong, "Dasein is the arche of the deliberation of phronesis (PS, 35)." Moreover, in know-how, there is trial and error, know-how learns to improve through its mistakes, "the one who is not ingrained in a definite technique, a set routine, but again and again starts anew [becomes the most proficient] (PS, 38)." Know-how wills the success as well as the failure, while circumspection (insight) is either-or, there is no failing involved, ''phronesis is not oriented toward trial and error; in moral action I carmot experiment with myself (PS, 96 38)." (m) The Difficulty of Attaining Aletlieia Heidegger indicates that pleasure and pain covers up what the proper being of man is in such a way that man is no longer transparent to himself, with the result that man can be the object of circumspection (insight) insofar as man is hidden from himself and must be uncovered. Moreover, "A person can be concerned with things of minor significance; he can be so wrapped up in himself that he does not genuinely see himself Therefore, he is ever in need of the salvation of circumspection (insight). Circumspection regarding himself and insight into himself must again and again be wrested away by man (PS, 36)." As long as pleasure and pain [lupe - what depresses one's disposition] are basic determinations of man, and if circumspection (insight) is not employed the proper 'for the sake of which' that man's actions are directed to will not be transparent, and since there is a constant tendency in man to cover himself up, the process of uncovering must never end in order that the end toward which circumspection (insight) aims, the good of man (anthropina agatha) is constantly in view. Circumspection (insight) is not absolute for such an aim, since it can only be attained if there is also action, as circumspection (insight) can only guide action. The person is therefore imderstood in terms of potential because insofar as action need not be enacted in accord with circumspection (insight), the action itself can indeed be otherwise. Circumspection (insight) is different from science in that circumspection (insight) requires life experience. Heidegger says that young people (he is thinking of Pascal) can become wise in mathematics, but not in circumspection (insight). Heidegger cites 97 Aristotle point that "young people are not experienced in the factual conditions of human Dasein itself (PS, 97)." Hence, young people can be accomplished mathematically but not philosophically, as mathematics deals merely with abstractions. '* Circumspection (insight) ultimately deals with the goal not of logos, but of nous - where the discourse ultimately ends. With the Doctor, for instance, he deliberates with the goal of making the patient healthy. At some point, the doctor will come to an insight,'^ an aisthesis, a straightforward perception that shows him what he must do in order to cure the patient, at which point there can be action. The outermost limit of the deliberation is the eschaton, at which point the insight arrives, a straightforward perception, the point at which we "see states of affairs as a whole (PS, 1 10)." This is the same as in geometry where a polygon is resolved into a triangle, and the triangle is seen as a simple whole. For the doctor it is never a question of whether to heal, since, as Heidegger says, this is the meaning of his existence and hence already posited from the outset. Another way to think of this is in terms of the futural structure of everyday existence. We exist in such a way that we 'are' as though our own death will not be the next actuality in our lives, as though there will be more time. This understanding of our own death as 'later' is not an explicit theme for our everyday existence, it is the meaning of it. The thing the doctor ultimately has in view is the point at which he can intervene. '*We will return to the issue of the relation of Greek thinking to the child later. "The notion of the insight follows, among other things, the Greek mathematicians. Heidegger comments that "The Greek mathematicians did not understand axioms as fundamental principles. What they had in mind can be seen in their paraphrase of the word: axiomata are koinai ennoiai. Plato used the word often; it means 'insight,' 'to have an insight' and indeed with the mind's eye (PR, 15).. 98 In this regard, the nous of circumspection (insight) is different from that of wisdom in that circumspection (insight) only deals with things in the here and now and hence with things that could be otherwise. The deliberation that results in the insight about how to treat the patient in front of us is entirely case dependent., and occurs "in the blink of an eye, a momentary look at what is momentarily concrete, which as such can always be otherwise. On the other hand, the noein in wisdom is a looking upon that which is aei, that which is always present in sameness. Time (the momentary and eternal) here frmctions to discriminate between the noein in circumspection (insight) and the one in Sophia ... [SJophia is Dasein's positionality toward the beings of the world in the full sense. Phronesis is Dasein's positionality toward the beings which are themselves Dasein(PS, 113)." Heidegger indicates that wisdom happens through theorein, which means that there is no production involved in wisdom, but rather an idleness, a "not accomplishing anything ... but a mere onlooking, a lingering with the object. (PS, 47)," that most properly uncovers beings. The object of wisdom are those things which always are, aei [the world, PS, 48], and hence cannot be otherwise. The objects of wisdom are obtained through seeing, because seeing is the sense that allows for the greatest determinations of things. Seeing is thus preeminent among the senses in that 'it lets many differences be seen'; seeing provides the greatest possibility for differentiating the things in their manifoldness and orienting oneself within them. This privileged position of horan is all the more remarkable in view of Aristotle's emphasis (b23) that akouein is the highest aisthesis. But that is not a contradiction. Hearing is basic to the constitution of man, the one who speaks. Hearing, along with speaking pertains to man's very possibility. Because man can hear, he can learn. Both senses, hearing and seeing, have, in different ways, a privilege: hearing makes 99 possible communication, understanding others; seeing has the privWege of being the primary disclosure of the world, so that what has been seen can be spoken of and appropriated more completely in logos (PS, 49) I would like to relate this to what Heidegger says of hearing in his later thought. Hearing attends to the call to the ground of beings, to pursue the essential and disregard the trivial, and allows us to distinguish them as such. Moreover, while seeing is concerned with major distinctions, hearing attends to subtle changes of tone, and is thereby able to attend to emphasis. Heidegger can thus ask, in one place, "[w]hat tone is Parmenides trying to set in letting us hear this resounding emphasis (EGT, Moira: Parmenides, 92)?" Heidegger points out that since Plato, anything that 'is' can be differentiated into two realms, the aistheton and the noeton, that which is apprehended by the senses and that which can be experienced by nous, the mind's eye. The noeton is that which truly is because it is not subject to the changeability of the things of the senses, and hence are constant. The particular house shows the essence, hoiise as such, but only in a limited way, and hence is me on, not simply nothing, ouk on, but deficient with respect to what tiiily is, the primary image, ttie paradeigma (cf HHTI, 24). Aristotie was the first to acknowledge that the actual beings we encounter everyday are real beings that need to be passed through in order to reach the universal, so that we can then come back and fiilly understand the particular, "it is necessary to press on, from what is in a single case initially most familiar, to the arche and to appropriate the arche in such a way that fi'om this apjM-opriation there takes place a genuine appropriation of the kathekaston (particular) (PS, 62)." Wisdom is hard for Dasein, not because the matters to be investigated are themselves overly convoluted, but because Dasein adheres to the 1(N) immediate and hence the passing over of the immediate in order to get to the universal is counter to the way in which Dasein nonnally is. Wisdom, as a mode of the being of Dasein, arises from Thaumazein, wonder at something encountered, or negatively, as I understand it, the unintelligibility of something encountered according to what one already understands, one is not equal to the encounter. Plato, in the 'Theatetus (155d2ff),' says wonder, thaumazein, is the origin of all philosophy. Heidegger understands wonder as resulting from "not knowing the way ... out of and into that which such knowing first opens up as an untrodden and ungrounded 'space.' This space (time-space) ... is that 'between' where it has not yet been determined what being is or what non-being is, though where by the same token a total confrision and undifTerentiation of beings and non-beings does not sweep everything away either, letting one thing wander into another. This distress, as - such not knowing the way out of or into this self-opening 'between,' is a mode of 'Being,' in which man arrives or perhaps is thrown and for the first time experiences - but does not explicitly consider - that which we are calling 'in the midst' of beings. (BQP, 132) This is not wonder at any particular thing, but that beings are as they are, beings as beings, or rather beings as a whole, the Being of beings that shine through them. Holderling says that the poet must grasp everything, not in the sense of systematically trying investigate everything, but rather beings as such and as a whole. According to Aristotle wonder proceeds from the simple things at hand, and goes to greater and greater cases until it asks if beings as a whole are as they seem. Heidegger says that thaumazein proceeds from aporein, from not being able to find your way through from which arises a desire to get through to the matters as they actually stand. On the basis of this, for the Greeks, who had a peculiar sense of being set over against things, namely, felt that 'not being absorbed in things' that we outlined earlier, "what the Greeks call aporia 101 characterizes the peculiar intermediate position of Dasein itself over and against the world (PS, 88)." (IV) Deception What I have said about the various ways of uncovering beings must now be related to the ways in which they can be concealed to us, namely, to deception. In order to see this, we will briefly re-visit the problem of the assertion. Heidegger says that Logos has the character of speaking of something as something, or, more specifically, as something else, such as saying the dog is grey or tall etc. The dog is determined in terms of what it is not. It is hence related to dinoein, a thinking through, not noein. But as we saw in the case oi circumspection (insight), noein occurred precisely when the thinking through was at an end, when the discourse had ended and the doctor received the insight about how to proceed, "[e]verything eschaton and everything /jro/on can be grasped properly only if the noein is not a dianoein but a pure onlooking. Here the disclosure in the mode of the carrying out of logos fails and recedes (PS, 124)." Gunter Figal completely misreads the issue when he says Aristotle cannot get at the noein at all because he only manages dianoein (cf , Refraining, 102)." Rather, Heidegger says that dianoein in Aristotle is what pertains to the logos. In fact, Heidegger says quite explicitly in Being and Time that "[t]he truth of aisthesis and of the seeing of 'ideas' is the primordial kind of uncovering. And only because noesis primarily uncovers, can the logos as dianoein also have uncovering as its function (BT, 269)." Hence, logos here is understood as subservient to nous. The 'insight' was not a determining something in terms of something else, but 102 rather a simple seeing of the whole. Logos, as Heidegger understood it in his early thought, does not primarily uncover beings, but only the logos apophantikos does, since it either reveals or distorts beings (pseudesthai), and even then not in a primary way. There can be truth, uncovering in a judgement, but it need not be there, and hence it is not contradictory for Aristotle to say at one place that truth is in the judgement and in another that it can be said without relation to it. In fact, ^Logos, insofar as it possesses the structure of apophainesihai, of 'something as something,' is so little the place of truth that it is, rather, quite the reverse, the proper condition of the possibility of falsity a (PS, 125)," that through the 'as' a deception can occur. How so? (V) The Problem of Antisthenes Heidegger points out that Antisthenes denied the possibility of addressing something as something, or, more specifically, something as something else (cf Aristotle's Topics A, chapter 11). In other words, Antisthenes denies the possibility of addressing something in the form oikataphasis (affirmation) and apophasis (denial), in the 'as' form, which also implies there can not be a contradiction, since a mere phasis (showing) cannot be false. The only manner Antisthenes allows for addressing things is by tautological naming, man is man. In this regard, Antisthenes denied the possibility of delimiting the essential content of a thing in a definition, because the definition is macros, containing many words, so it attempts to exhibit one thing in terms of many things, in that the thing itself as a one is not addressed but rather is addressed in terms of what it is not. This is what Heidegger says Aristotle accepted as the positive content of Antisthenes thesis, that a being cannot be properly exhibited in a definition. 103 Falsity, thought in the Greek sense, is hepseudes, a deception, "it lets something be seen as present, which is not present ... Thus it does not mean that a false logos concerns that which is not at all fouk on], but rather it lets something not present be seen as present ... In my speech I shove, in a certain sense, in from of what is there something else, and I pass off what is there as something it is not, ie., as something that is not present (PS, 349)." Heidegger gives the example of addressing a triangle as a circle. Following what has been said, the circle is, so to speak, thrust in front of the triangle, and I treat the triangle as though it is not there. 1 understand this to mean that in this sense, a false proposition is deceptive, a fraud, false in the sense we speak of false money. Moreover, "fljogos, even as legomenon, is, in the Greek sense, always oriented toward being communicated, expressed for another person, so that the other person can participate in the seeing. Insofar as the other, in the case of a deceptive logos, cannot participate in the seeing, such a logos is not simply 'false,' but fraudulent (PS, 349)." For Aristotle, the judgement is not so much an agreement of the judgement with the thing but a letting be seen and a coimter-phenomenon of deceptive seeing, distortion. We shall now make this more explicit. The kind of logos under discussion, as Aristotle understands it, can have two possibilities. It is either the definition that supposedly properly shows the being, or one of the manifold determinations of beings, "[fjor in a certain sense every being coincides with itself as itself and uath itself as it is qualified (PS, 350)." The latter manner is in a sense derivative because it involves a synthesis, a joining together with that which already is in itself with somethin

Tags: absolute
Vai alla home di questo BLOG Segnala un abuso nel post

Studenti.it Iscriviti alla community di Studenti.it Segnala un abuso Crea il tuo blog Foto Vip
© BanzaiMedia | Community | Tutti i video | Testi canzoni | Cinema e Film | Aiuto e supporto